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THE PARADOX OF PROCEDURAL
REFORM
OSCAR G. CHASE*
INTRODUCTION: THE PARADox DESCRIBED
This symposium properly celebrates the fiftieth anniversary of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Let me add a cheer for an-
other procedural anniversary: 1988 is the twenty-fifth year in the
life of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (the "CPLR"),
which became effective on September 1, 1963.1
The CPLR is the principal statute regulating dispute adjudi-
cation in New York State. It prescribes civil procedure in the Su-
preme Court-the trial court of general jurisdiction-and in the
County Courts.2 It also governs practice in the appellate courts3
and, to a limited extent, in the inferior trial courts.4
In this Article, I will relate something of the background of
the CPLR and argue that this history presents an example of a
neglected paradox of procedural reform. The recognition and
description of this paradox may improve our understanding of the
reform of procedure in New York and, perhaps, elsewhere. Put
simply, the political engine which has driven procedural reform in
New York, as illustrated by the case of the CPLR, has been dis-
content with the slow pace of litigation.5 The enactment of the
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. The author is grateful for the
generous support of the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund of New
York University School of Law. He would also like to thank Professors Margaret Berger,
William Nelson, Linda Silberman, and Judge Jack B. Weinstein for their thoughtful com-
ments. Arthur Larkin, Class of 1989, N.Y.U. School of Law, provided valuable research
assistance.
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 10005 (McKinney 1977) [hereinafter CPLR].
2 See CPLR 101; D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE 3 (1978). See generally 0. CHASE,
CIVIL LITIGATION IN NEW YORK x-xi (1983) (explanation of how CPLR applies to courts of
differing jurisdiction).
3 See CPLR arts. 55-57.
' See D. SIEGEL, supra note 2, at 3-4.
5 H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN & B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT xxiv (2d ed. 1959) [herein-
after DELAY IN THE COURT]. In this classic study Zeisel, Kalven, and Buchholz argue that,
despite its many negative effects, court delay "is a political issue of curiously low intensity,
not one that commandeers persistent political pressure on its behalf." Id. This view may be
seen as opposed to my attempt here to ascribe some political force to discontent with court
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CPLR would probably not have been achieved without a delay cri-
sis directly traceable to the wave of auto accident litigation which
began in the late forties. Paradoxically, reform of the rules of pro-
cedure within the ambit allowed by the restraints of culture and
politics is unlikely to have, and in the case of New York's reform
has apparently not had, any positive effect on litigation pace.
I. THE ROOTS AND LIMITS OF PROCEDURAL REFORM
The enactment of the CPLR, according to then-Governor
Rockefeller, represented "the first major revision of civil procedure
in the New York Courts in over a century."6 Not all contemporary
observers shared this grand gubernatorial perspective. The Senate
Finance Committee, in its important Sixth Report on the proposed
CPLR,7 noted that the Field Code of 1848 (to which Governor
Rockefeller referred) was replaced in 1880 by the Code of Civil
Procedure-commonly known as the Throop Code-which was re-
vised in turn and recodified in 1920 as the Civil Practice Act,
which in its own turn yielded to the CPLR. From another view,
then, the CPLR was one of a series rather than one of a kind. Per-
haps we can allow the former Governor his place in procedural his-
tory while at the same time observing that New York does seem to
have a rough forty-year cycle of procedural reform in this area.' If
that is so, we are at the mid-point of the cycle and this, too, offers
incentive for examining procedural reform. Furthermore, proce-
dural change is effected apart from wholesale code revision. One
procedural historian reported that between 1846 and 1953 there
were twenty-five commissions devoted to the topic which produced
30,000 pages of reports.9 Also, the law of procedure lies in cases, as
well as statutes and rules, and it therefore grows and changes as a
delay. The conflict does not in fact exist. I do not argue that delay is a domestic political
issue equivalent in the public mind to taxes, education, housing, or crime. I do argue that it
is the only concern which has focussed public attention on the problems of civil procedure.
Likewise, Zeisel, Kalven, and Buchholz recognize that there has been a long history of pub-
lic concern about delay in New York. Id. at 19.
6 Governor's Memorandum on Approval of Civil Practice Law and Rules (Apr. 4, 1962),
reprinted in [1962] N.Y. Laws 3621 (McKinney) [hereinafter Governor's Memorandum].
' SIXTH REPORT OF THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, reprinted in [1962] N.Y. Laws
3333 (McKinney) [hereinafter SIXTH REPORT].
' This cycle was apparently first observed and commented upon by Daniel H. Distler.
See Weinstein, Proposed Revision of New York Civil Practice, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 86-87
(1960).
' Nims, New York's 100 Years Struggle for Better Civil Justice, 25 N.Y. ST. B.A. BULL.
83, 88 (1953).
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part of the common law, through judicial decisions."
In this vein, the very adoption of the CPLR, or of any reform
that involves the scrapping of one procedural code for another, is
especially interesting. It requires a major expenditure of effort by
talented people, the mobilization of legislative attention, and the
overcoming of a natural inertia in favor of the settled and familiar,
as both the bar and the judiciary always have an interest in the
maintenance of the ancien regime.
Why does reform happen? In part, the answer is traceable to a
general streak of reformism that runs through American public
life. Were our society not reformist, there would be no CPLR or
Federal Rules and no anniversaries to mark. There are two ingredi-
ents to reformism as I use the term here. First, the notion-almost
a metaphysical stance-that social institutions are, if not perfect-
ible, at least improvable and that they can be improved through
the application of the rational processes of study, thought, and dis-
cussion. Lawrence Friedman suggested that the nineteenth century
movement to codify procedural and substantive law reflected the
"Age of Reason."11 This is also true of the adoption of the CPLR.
The second relevant aspect of reformism is the governmental incli-
nation to respond to popular dissatisfaction, insofar as the political
conditions then current permit. In this regard, reform is a political
phenomenon. To the extent that one can judge from public state-
ments and actions of political leaders, one complaint stands out as
a driving force in the history of procedural reform in New York:
delay. In substantial part, the adoption of the CPLR can be traced
to continued dissatisfaction with the pace of litigation in New
York (which, as we shall see, came to a head in the 1950s) and, by
implication, to the failure of earlier reforms to make the desired
improvements. 2
10 See Nelson, The Reform of Common Law Pleading in Massachusetts 1760-1830: Ad-
judication as a Prelude to Legislation, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 97, 98 (1973) (argues that the
reform of pleading in nineteenth century Massachusetts was effected first in judicial deci-
sions which were only later enacted into statute).
See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 393, 403 (2d ed. 1985).
12 I do not suggest that New York is the only jurisdiction in which litigation delay has
been a problem. Dean Vanderbilt collected examples of complaints about it from Biblical
times, the Roman Empire, fifteenth century England, Shakespeare, and others. See A. VAN-
DERBILT, IMPROVING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE-Two DECADES OF DEVELOPMENT 6-8
(1957). For a recent comparative treatment, see Chase, Civil Litigation Delay in Italy and
the United States, 36 AaM. J. CoMF. L. 41, 46-48 (1988) (describing marked delay plaguing
contemporary Italian courts).
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For a variety of reasons no reform has solved completely the
problem of litigation delay in New York. Statutory amendments
are not always received with benevolence by the courts which must
apply them. Judges who have been educated under, and spent a
lifetime applying, one set of procedural rules are tempted to rein-
troduce them through interpretation of new laws. Such was said to
be the fate of the pleading reform which was at the heart of the
Field Code.'" Moreover, social and economic changes ultimately
combine to outmode even salutary changes. I refer here partly to
changes in fashion 4 and partly to changes in underlying reality.15
Most important-and at the heart of my present thesis-is that
the type of change in the rules of civil litigation which is politically
possible simply cannot significantly affect litigation delay and is
unlikely to improve it at all. The restraining politics are mul-
tilevel. 6 There are the immediate politics of interest groups which
oppose delay reduction whenever it hurts their particular interests.
Liability insurers may be an example. More fundamental are the
" See C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 83 (2d ed. 1947) ("'[t]he
cold, not to say inhuman, treatment which the infant Code received from the New York
judges is a matter of history' ") (quoting McArthur v. Moffett, 143 Wis. 564, 567, 128 N.W.
445, 446 (1910)).
" An example of change in procedural fashion is the use of a single judge to control the
trial calendar of the court and rule on all applications for adjournments. This approach,
then called the "Cleveland plan," was urged, and later adopted, as an important time saver.
See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NEW YORK STATE,
LEG. Doc. No. 50, at 28-37 (1934) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE REPORT]. In 1986,
it was scrapped, as part of a reform effort directed in part at delay, under which cases are
assigned to a single judge for all purposes, including calendaring for trial. See [1988] 22
N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 202.3, 202.22.
'" See infra notes 67-76 and accompanying text (discussing rise in auto accident
litigation).
" Geoffrey Hazard has succinctly described his view of the difficulties of streamlining
existing procedures:
Immediate resistance to such reforms of course emanates from the legal profes-
sion, for change radical enough to have much effect threatens the bar's intellectual
capital, which is its specialized knowledge of present practice. There are also
deeper difficulties entailed in radical procedural change. Streamlined procedures
by definition involve more limited examination of individual cases and by neces-
sity can yield different outcomes, as compared with preexisting procedures. Yet
existing procedures by definition constitute legal fairness. Procedural change
therefore raises issues of principle, often ones of constitutional significance. To
this evil is added the fact that changes in procedure may reflect differences in
outcome. Since present outcomes by definition legally conform to the require-
ments of distributive justice, procedural change necessarily entails the risk of dis-
tributive injustice.
Hazard, Court Delay: Toward New Premises, 5 Civ. JUST. Q. 236, 241 (1986) (footnotes
omitted).
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restraints which are so deep as to be properly called "cultural"
rather than political. As Jerold Auerbach has observed:
In every society there is a wide range of alternatives for cop-
ing with the conflict stirred by personal disputes .... The vari-
eties of dispute settlement, and the socially sanctioned choices in
any culture, communicate the ideals people cherish, their percep-
tions of themselves, and the quality of their relationships with
others .... Ultimately the most basic values of society are re-
vealed in its dispute-settlement procedures. 17
Change which affects disputing processes in a way that impli-
cates considerations of this order is unlikely, regardless of the de-
gree of efficiency improvement promised."8 Here the civil jury is a
good example. Undoubtedly litigation would be faster without it.
Yet its elimination would be enormously difficult politically and
would not, in my view, be worth the gain in any case because it is
such an important social and political institution.
I do not contend that profound procedural reform has never
occurred; nor that such reform has never achieved the goal of delay
reduction. Cappelletti has described impressive nineteenth century
Continental examples of reforms which substantially improved the
pace of litigation in the countries adopting them.19 The fact is,
however, that he speaks of a single major reform in each of several
countries over a period of centuries. Moreover, the reforms of pro-
cedure he describes all seem to have taken place as a part of major
social transformations in the relevant nations, as in France after
the Revolution, or Austria after the decline of the Empire. Thus,
these rare counter-examples in fact support my thesis that the re-
form of procedure is usually motivated by political movements
arising from litigation delay and is paradoxically limited by the po-
17 J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 3-4 (1983).
18 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 56. This report was a major
study which took the problem of delay as one of its foci. In their conclusion, the Commis-
sion said:
Nor was it intended that we should devote these many months to vain specula-
tions upon what our system of law might have been if its origin and unusually
consistent development had been different. That course would have led us where
others would have been unwilling to follow. Hence our proposals for reconstruc-
tion are confined strictly within the framework of our established system, in the
belief that the structure itself is still sound ....
Id. The same sentiment was expressed by those who drafted the CPLR. See Weinstein,
supra note 8, at 53.
19 Cappelletti, Social and Political Aspects of Civil Procedure-Reforms and Trends in
Western and Eastern Europe, 69 MICH. L. REv. 847, 851-60 (1971).
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litical culture in which it is attempted.
In assessing the limited success of procedural reform in New
York, we must, lastly, keep in mind that while delay reduction pro-
vides the political will for procedural reform, it should never be the
only goal. Expense reduction, improved fact finding, simplification,
modernization, and distributional politics have all played their
part. I do not discount the achievements that have been made in
these respects, but will not try in this Article to evaluate them.
II. PRE-CPLR REFORM
A. The Field Code and Its Successors
Complaints about litigation delay in New York's courts can be
traced back at least as far as 1839, when David Dudley Field wrote,
"Speedy justice is a thing unknown; and any justice, without de-
lays almost ruinous, is most rare."20 Despite the adoption of the
Field Code in 1848,21 the problem did not go away. Although sta-
tistics are not available, discontent is evident in the various pro-
posals to amend or replace the Field Code which culminated in the
Throop Code of 1876.22 This was of little avail, as far as reducing
delay, and by 1902 the legislature found it appropriate to establish
a Commission on Law's Delays (the "Commission"). 2 The Com-
mission, which reported in 1904, found that "the conditions which
embarrass the courts and menace their usefulness and authority
... are not temporary and of recent origin but chronic, and arise
20 Letter from David Dudley Field to Gulian C. Verplanck, The Reform of the Judicial
System of this State (1840), quoted in A. VANDERBILT, supra note 12, at 5 n.12. There is
some indication that Field was primarily concerned with delay in the Court of Chancery.
See Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Historical Perspective, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 937-38 (1987).
According to a contemporary publication, The Democratic Review, in 1846 the Supreme
Court in New York City was two and a half years delayed, and the average disposition time
in the Court of Chancery was five years. See Nims, supra note 9, at 83.
21 Ch. 379, [1848] N.Y. Laws 497. The Field Code took effect on July 1, 1848 and acted
as the code governing civil procedure in New York for almost 30 years. Coe & Morse, Chro-
nology of the Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238, 242
(1942).
Lawrence Friedman states that the nineteenth century reform movement, which re-
sulted in the Field Code and its followers in other states, was in part a response to the need
of businesses for an efficient system of case processing. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at
389, 396-97.
2 See Nims, supra note 9, at 84.
23 Ch. 485, [1902] N.Y. Laws 1109 (amended and supplemented by Ch. 634, [1903] N.Y.
Laws 1434); see DELAY IN THE COURT, supra note 5, at 19-20; Nims supra note 9, at 85.
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from profound causes which the previous efforts of lawyers and
legislators have failed to remove."24 More specifically, the Commis-
sion reported that the trial term in the Supreme Court for New
York County was about three years behind in its calendar. 5 None
of its recommendations, however, were adopted.26 It was not until
1920 that a new procedural code was enacted. This was the Civil
Practice Act,27 which, "[e]ven at the time of its enactment... was
widely criticized as being little more than a recodification of the
old Code of Civil Procedure."2 The Civil Practice Act was "sub-
jected to a generation of constant amendment,"2 9 and the problems
of civil litigation-especially the issue of delay-continued to be of
concern.
B. Roosevelt and His Era
It has been forgotten that an enthusiast of procedural reform
during the late twenties and early thirties was Franklin Delano
Roosevelt. He is perhaps the only person of whom it can be said
that his efforts were important in the history of both the adoption
of the Federal Rules and the CPLR. The "double anniversary" we
celebrate is an apt occasion for recalling his contributions.
Judicial administration was a theme of Roosevelt's gubernato-
rial election campaign. In his nomination acceptance speech, he
said:
I would also speak very briefly of a subject that goes deep to
the roots of effective government: the system by which justice is
administered. I am confident that the procedure of both civil and
criminal law has failed to keep pace with the advancement of bus-
iness methods and with the needs of a practical age; that this pro-
cedure is too costly, too slow, too complex; and that the present
methods are at least in part responsible for disregard of law and
for many miscarriages of justice.30
24 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON LAW'S DELAYS, S. Doc. No. 21, at 4 (1904).
"6 Id. at 9.
26 Nims, supra note 9, at 85.
27 Ch. 925, [1920] N.Y. Laws 19. The adoption of the Civil Practice Act was the culmi-
nation of studies by the New York Board of Statutory Consolidation, which produced re-
ports on procedural reform in 1912 and 1915. See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of
1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1056-61 (1982).
26 REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE COURTS, LEG. Doc. No. 45, at 20
(1955).
29 Id.
20 The Candidate Accepts the Nomination for the Governorship (Oct. 16, 1928), re-
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Roosevelt returned to this theme in a campaign address, this
time calling for a commission to study the causes of litigation delay
and emphasizing the need for lay involvement in the project." As
Governor, Roosevelt worked for the creation of a commission to
study litigation problems. He vetoed the first legislative response
because the bill enacted would have created a body composed only
of lawyers. 2 His objection was not based on populism but on a
mistrust of the bar's willingness to question its own assumptions
and on a desire to see the commission reflect "business efficiency":
The function of such a commission should be to examine not
merely the superficial defects of the present administration of
justice but rather the very frame-work and foundations of the
system, which is universally regarded as archaic, expensive and
inefficient. With that end in view, the commission should be com-
posed of a large percentage of business[men] and other laymen,
whose interest would be centered on this broad survey.33
The Legislature soon enacted, and the Governor signed, a bill
more to his liking.3 4 The Commission on the Administration of
Justice in New York State (the "Justice Commission") was consti-
tuted in 1931, when its fourteen members were appointed. 5 In
1934, the Justice Commission produced a lengthy and detailed
study with numerous recommendations.3 6
In the meanwhile, Governor Roosevelt sought the support of
the bar in his reform efforts. His address to the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, entitled The Road to Judicial Re-
form,7 was an important document because in it Roosevelt set
printed in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 13, 15 (1938) [here-
inafter PUBLIC PAPERS].
11 Campaign Address (Oct. 30, 1928), reprinted in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 30, at
64-65.
32 The Governor Vetoes a Bill Creating a Commission, Exclusively of Lawyers, to Study
the Administration of Justice (Apr. 5, 1929), reprinted in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 30, at
268.
I /d.
See Ch. 186, [1931] N.Y. Laws 531. Roosevelt said, "I feel confident that [this law]
will go a long way toward making justice in this State cheaper and speedier." The Governor
Approves a Bill Creating a Commission of Layman and Lawyers to Study the Administra-
tion of Justice (Apr. 23, 1930), reprinted in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra note 30, at 270.
11 See ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 5. Six were appointed by
the legislature, two by the New York State Bar Association, and six by the Governor. Id.
36 Id.
3' The Road to Judicial Reform (Mar. 12, 1932), reprinted in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS, supra
note 30, at 271.
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forth in some detail his view of the problems of the justice system.
His position, though he did not acknowledge it, was clearly influ-
enced by Roscoe Pound's famous 1906 speech to the American Bar
Association, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Ad-
ministration of Justice.38 Roosevelt said:
It is unnecessary to take time in establishing the fact that
the administration of justice is generally unpopular with the peo-
ple of this country. Growing complaint with the law's injustices,
delays and costs has to a great extent characterized every genera-
tion. The present one is no exception .... Speedy and efficient
justice in a vast community like this is a public necessity, to be
ranked with health, sanitation and police protection .... It may
be taken for granted that much of [the problem] is due to the fact
that the rules of the legal game are such that in the absence of
very strong administrative control they will be used, not for a di-
rect search for the truth, but to permit such legal maneuvers as
will further the interests of those who do not want the truth to be
found.39
Reform in the administration of justice, Roosevelt said,
"means an attack much more fundamental than the mere altera-
tion of rules of procedure."40 He offered two examples of potential
38 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906). Pound grouped the causes of popular dissatisfaction into
four categories: "(1) Causes for dissatisfaction with any legal system, (2) causes lying in the
peculiarities of our Anglo-American legal system, (3) causes lying in our American judicial
organization and procedure, and (4) causes lying in the environment of our judicial adminis-
tration." Id. at 397. Of Pound's specific points, one (which he put under the second of his
broad categories) was what he described as:
[Our American exaggerations of the common law contentious procedure. The
sporting theory of justice.., is so rooted in ... America that most of us take if for
a fundamental legal tenet .... Hence in America we take it as a matter of course
that a judge should be a mere umpire, to pass upon objections and hold counsel to
the rules of the game, and that the parties should fight out their own game in
their own way without judicial interference.... The idea that procedure must of
necessity be wholly contentious disfigures our judicial administration at every
point.
Id. at 404-05.
Under his third general heading he included the "waste of judicial power" involved in
our system. Id. at 409. He said:
Judicial power may be wasted in three ways: (1) By rigid districts or courts or
jurisdictions, so that business may be congested in one court while judges in an-
other are idle, (2) by consuming the time of courts with points of pure practice,
when they ought to be investigating substantial controversies, and (3) by nullify-
ing the results of judicial action by unnecessary retrials.
Id. at 412.
11 The Road to Judicial Reform, supra note 37, at 271.
40 Id. at 275.
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improvements, only one of which could be considered "fundamen-
tal." He suggested adoption of the "master calendar" system,41 and
the development of statewide statistics on the operation of the
courts in order to better measure the pace of litigation.42 The latter
suggestion was subsequently recommended by his Justice Commis-
sion, 43  and adopted by later administrations.44 At the least,
Roosevelt deserves credit for the attention and energy he brought
to the drive for procedural modernity. His constant attention to
issues of speed and efficiency underscore my general thesis of the
importance of the pace of litigation in the history of New York
court reform.
C. The Federal Model
The same desire for an efficient system of adjudication that
motivated efforts in New York was, during the same period, fueling
those who wanted to modernize federal practice.45 The basic issue
for the federal reformers was whether there should be a federal
code of procedure or whether the federal courts should continue to
apply the procedure of the state in which they sat.4 After decades
of struggle, the matter was favorably resolved when the Rules Ena-
Id. at 276; see also ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 26-27 (rec-
ommended adoption of the "Cleveland" calendar procedure in every county in which more
than one court was in session).
42 The Road to Judicial Reform, supra note 37, at 277-78.
The value of such information, systematically gathered and intelligently
presented, is of extraordinary importance. It will give officials themselves a picture
of the state of litigation in the courts which will permit us to know what work the
courts are doing, how much of it there is, and how long it takes to dispose of cases.
Id. at 277.
43 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 38-39. The Justice Commission
recommended the formation of a Judicial Council modeled after the Federal Judicial Con-
ference which had been established by Chief Justice Taft. The Judicial Council recom-
mended was to be composed of judges, lawyers, legislators, and laymen. It was to be respon-
sible for monitoring the court system, keeping and compiling statistics, and making
recommendations for improvements. Id. at 34-36.
" From 1935 to 1955 statistical reports were produced by the Judicial Council, from
1956 to 1978 by the Judicial Conference, and since 1979 by the Chief Administrator of the
Courts.
45 See Burbank, supra note 27, at 1043-47. For a discussion of the influence of the New
York reformers on the early development of a federal procedure code from the end of the
nineteenth century until 1915, see id. at 1043-50. Much of the attention was focussed on the
proper allocation of power between statute and rules of court. See id.
4" See id. at 1035-97 (comprehensive assessment of significant events leading up to pas-
sage of Rules Enabling Act).
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bling Act was enacted in 1934.4  Success has been attributed to the
appointment of a new Attorney General who was enthusiastic
about adopting a federal code and to the personal support of Presi-
dent Roosevelt. 48  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
promulgated, of course, four years later.4 9
I have not attempted to determine whether and how the para-
dox which is the subject of this Article is relevant to the Federal
Rules and their history. The "codeless" situation in which the fed-
eral courts existed until 1938 was unusual and arguably required a
remedy even apart from any delay affecting the courts. Perhaps
the Rules Enabling Act is better explained as an example of the
tendency of the times to concentrate authority in the federal gov-
ernment. Yet, that tendency itself often proceeded in the name of
efficiency. It is not unlikely that Roosevelt's support for the feder-
alization of civil procedure flowed from his earlier campaign to ra-
tionalize, and thus speed, the operation of the New York courts.
Only further research will answer these questions. °
The Federal Rules were influential in spurring procedural re-
form in the states, some of which adopted them almost immedi-
ately.51 By 1958, fourteen states had "fully" adopted the Federal
Rules. 52 Given the consensus that existed as early as 1934 that
New York's Civil Practice Act needed wholesale revision,5 and the
response of other states to the readily available federal model, one
may speculate why New York did not adopt its own comprehensive
47 See Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)).
See Burbank, supra note 27, at 1095-98.
" See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 64, at 404 (4th ed. 1983). For a brief
history of the period between the adoption of the Rules Enabling Act and the Federal Rules
themselves, see id. at 403-04.
11 On the motivation for the federal reform, see Weinstein & Weiner, Of Sailing Ships
and Seeking Facts: Brief Reflections on Magistrates and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 429 (1988). The authors argue that the reformers sought to
improve the federal judiciary's ability to address social problems and provide justice, and
that expeditious case handling was important to these fundamental goals. The complex
roots of the Federal Rules are also described in detail in Burbank, supra note 27, at 1035,
and in Subrin, supra note 20, at 943. The goals most often mentioned are uniformity, flexi-
bility, and the elimination of technicality.
1 See Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLum. L. REV. 435, 435
(1958) [hereinafter Clark, Two Decades]. See generally Clark, Code Pleading and Practice
Today, in THE FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS 55, 67-70 (1949) [hereinafter Clark, Code Pleading]
(discussing adoption and influence of Federal Rules in states).
52 Clark, Two Decades, supra note 51, at 435 n.2.
"' See ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 14, at 41-47.
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reform until twenty-five years later, as well as why New York's re-
form did not take the relatively simple solution of wholesale adop-
tion of the Federal Rules.
D. New York Developments After the Federal Rules
By no means did New York reject the Federal Rules entirely.
Charles Clark, the Reporter to the Supreme Court's Advisory
Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure from 1935 to 1956 and a
trenchant critic of civil procedure in New York,54 found that by
1955 the state had amended its Civil Practice Act to incorporate
the substance of the Federal Rules on party joinder, intervention,
impleader, interpleader, and motions for directed verdict. In addi-
tion, he found that pretrial practice and discovery changes were
also tending to follow the Federal Rules. 5 But these amendments
represented only a small piece of the picture, as Judge Clark recog-
nized when he urged "a really complete reform . . . [as] piecemeal
reform is often worse than no reform at all."'56
Three years later, Judge Clark expressed "keen regret" about
New York's failure to follow the federal pattern. In addition to
the obstacles he found applicable to all laggard jurisdictions (jeal-
ousy of the federal success and "the usual fear of older and settled
members of the legal profession who see their skills being chal-
lenged"),58 he offered several explanations for the New York
resistance:
The sheer bulk of cases and of courts tends toward paralysis and
inertia. The lack of clearly developed procedural objectives pro-
motes such a diversity of ruling that support for practically any
position, sound or unsound, can be found somewhere in the
precedents. The historic and continuing rivalry between upstate
New York and metropolitan New York City makes any co-opera-
tive advance seem but a dream; and now sharp discord between
state and federal authorities has presented an added source of
discord. 9
Other reasons also probably played a part. New York's power-
See generally Clark, A Modern Procedure for New York, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1194
(1955) (suggesting procedural reform in New York should emulate federal model).
" Id. at 1201.
6 d.
See Clark, Two Decades, supra note 51, at 448.
68 Id. at 447.
Id. at 448.
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ful and prideful bar was not likely to simply seize someone else's
model (the states that did were predominantly Rocky Mountain or
Southwestern)." Nor was it obvious that what was good for the
relatively small federal judiciary with its own mix of cases would
also be appropriate for a very different bench and bar with a
caseload of very different proportions. The New York Bar leaders
had already invested enormous effort in their own study, the 1934
Report, and therefore had their own agenda for reform. Moreover,
the state had sufficient resources and talent to perform an addi-
tional study to determine what rules would work best for it. 1
New York's failure to adopt a new code until 1962 (whether or
not modeled after the Federal Rules) may also be explained in part
by the eruption of World War II, which naturally channelled en-
ergy elsewhere, and thus deflected whatever momentum for reform
might have been generated by the Federal Rules' adoption.
Still, more than seven years passed from the release of the
1934 Report to Pearl Harbor. Enough time, surely, had there been
the political desire to adopt a new code as well as the conviction
that it would be desirable. But Roosevelt's election to the Presi-
dency in 1932 meant that his energy was no longer behind state
procedure reform.62 Also, and more to the point of my thesis, de-
lay, which had peaked in the early thirties, had fallen off as the
decade wore on.63
III. THE COMING OF THE CPLR
A. The Demand for Reform
The goal of full reform of procedure in New York languished
until 1953. In that year, Governor Dewey's annual message in-
cluded a proposal to establish and fund a Temporary Commission
10 See Clark, Code Pleading, supra note 51, at 67. Some states which had chosen to
adopt the Federal Rules in substantial part later encountered difficulties in adapting them
to their own practice. See Weinstein, supra note 8, at 57-59. The Advisory Committee which
developed the CPLR was well aware of this phenomenon. See id. at 58-59.
"' See Weinstein, supra note 8, at 53-60 (describing process by which Advisory Com-
mittee decided whether to recommend federal rule or some other solution to procedural
problems).
62 His efforts on the federal level contributed to the adoption of the Rules Enabling
Act. See Burbank, supra note 27, at 1096.
11 See FOURTEENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. COUNCIL 28 (1948) [hereinafter FOURTEENTH
ANN. REP.]. "By 1941, as a result of a concentrated program of legislation, court rule and
administration ... the problem of delay which had loomed very large in 1934 appeared to
have been substantially solved." Id.
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on the Courts to evaluate the courts and their processes. The mes-
sage stressed problems familiar to proceduralists, mentioning
"[c]alendar delays, costly litigation, more costly appeals, proce-
dural complexity and clumsy detailed practice statutes."6 4 The
Governor added, "We cannot be proud of this as a description of
conditions in our State. In the neighboring state of New Jersey we
have seen an enviable improvement in the administration of jus-
tice."6 5 (New York second to New Jersey? What could better
arouse lawyerly and political pride?) The Temporary Commission
was subsequently authorized and funded by the state legislature.6
By the early fifties an important new factor had been intro-
duced, which accounts for the renewal of political attention. This
was the relentless growth of litigation arising from auto accidents.
The growth was caused by changing economics and technology af-
ter World War II: the boom in the car market, the end of gasoline
rationing, and the widespread availability of insured defendants as
a result of the adoption in New York of the Motor Vehicle Respon-
sibility Act in 1941.7 The number of new actions commenced in
the Supreme Court, New York County, which had averaged about
4,200 between 1941 and 1945, rose to over 7,000 by 1946, to over
9,500 by 1948,68 and exceeded 10,000 in the judicial year 1952-53.69
Most of the increase consisted of negligence cases. In 1944-45,
roughly 3,600 of these were added to the calendar of that court,
but by 1946-47 there were over 6,000.0
64 See N.Y. Gov. Ann. Mess. (1953), reprinted in [1953] N.Y. Laws 2019, 2023.
65 Id.
"' See Ch. 591, [1953] N.Y. Laws 1382. The alleviation of delay and congestion was one
of the goals assigned to the Commission. See id. § 2.
17 See PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE COURTS, LEG. Doc.
No. 66, at 13 (1954) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT]; FOURTEENTH ANN. REP., supra note
63, at 29; Hecht, Expediting Trial of Cases in New York County, 287 ANNALS 134 (1953).
The Judicial Conference reported in 1956 that while the state's population had in-
creased by 22.2% between 1942 and 1955, the number of motor vehicles registered had in-
creased by 78.3%, and the number of motor vehicle accidents by 163.5%. This change was
the major cause of the court congestion then current. See SECOND ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CON-
FERENCE 43 (1957).
"' See Hecht, supra note 67, at 134.
" See TWENTIETH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. COUNCIL 94 (1954) (statistical table recording
case volume in New York State). The judicial year ran from July 1, 1952 to June 30, 1953.Id.
70 See FOURTEENTH ANN. REP., supra note 63, at 29. The trend in the other metropoli-
tan counties was the same. Id. Statewide, the total number of new cases rose from 33,524 in
1944-45 to 52,897 in 1946-47. See TWELFTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. COUNCIL 30 (1946); FOUR-
TEENTH ANN. REP., supra note 63, at 36. Caseload records were recorded from July 1 of one
year to June 30 of the next.
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The courts were unable to keep pace with this flood of litiga-
tion. Delay had been virtually eliminated during the war years;
however, "[w]ith the return of peacetime conditions ... delay in
tort jury cases in the Supreme Court in New York City ha[d] in-
creased steadily. ' 71 This made delay in the Supreme Court of New
York a personal concern of the public at large, arguably for the
first time. 2 This delay was evidenced by at least seventy-five refer-
ences to court congestion problems in The New York Times during
the first ten months of 1956."3 Thus, a necessary ingredient of the
reform process-a politically viable demand for change-was in
place. The connection is apparent in the Preliminary Report of the
Temporary Commission appointed by Governor Dewey. It noted
that in 1943 only four counties had delay on their jury calendars of
more than six months (from filing of note of issue to trial) and that
the maximum was nine months; by 1953, nineteen counties were
experiencing six-month delay and the maximum was fifty-six
months. 74 The delay was apparently confined to the tort jury cal-
endar; even in New York County the commercial (and other) cal-
endars were up to date.75
The Temporary Commission attributed the tort calendar de-
lay to the automobile related factors mentioned above. One witness
before the Commission, a judge sitting in Queens County and Pres-
ident of the County Judges' Association of the State of New York,
stated:
"The public won't stand for the delays.... They all ask you ex-
actly the same question: 'Why does it take so long? And if we
don't settle it, how long will it be before our case is tried?' When
I tell them.., it may be a couple of years or three or three and a
half years, they can't understand why. 76
71 See FOURTEENTH ANN. REP., supra note 63, at 28.
72 Prior reforms owed more to the demands of commercial classes than to the public at
large. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 389, 396-97.
7' See DELAY IN THE COURT, supra note 5, at 297. An accompanying bibliography lists
dozens of articles about court delay published in professional and popular publications dur-
ing the early fifties. See id. at 298-303; see also Hecht, supra note 67, at 134-40 (discussing
factors responsible for delay in New York Courts and possible solutions).
7' See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 67, at 13.
75 Id. "Up to date," under New York's statistical system does not mean that the liti-
gants did not experience delay resulting from discovery, motion practice, or lawyer neglect,
it only means that the courts were prepared to entertain any case ready for trial. Id.
7 AssoCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, BAD HOUSEKEEPING, THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF THE NEW YORK COURTS 16-17 (1954) (quoting Statement of William B. Groat,
president of the County Judges' Association of the State of New York, Hearing Before the
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The Temporary Commission produced several studies and rec-
ommended several measures for improving the administration of
justice. In its 1956 report, the Commission recommended a revision
of the procedural code, which it said, "is one of the fundamental
conditions for the elimination of the causes for popular and profes-
sional dissatisfaction with the workings of our judicial sys-
tem-expense, delay and the determination of cases on points of
procedural technicality rather than on their substantive merits. ' 7
The Commission found that "an over-all study and revision is re-
quired if New York State is to have a satisfactory system of civil
procedure. 7 To promote the revision the Temporary Commission
appointed an Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure. The
Advisory Committee, which was composed of ten attorneys from
throughout the State, retained a paid staff, the chief of which, as
Reporter, was Jack B. Weinstein, then a professor at the Columbia
Law School.79
Between 1955 and 1961 the Advisory Committee produced
four preliminary reports and a final report, plus numerous studies
and draft provisions.8" It was quite rightly said that their study of
civil practice was "one of the most complete ever made."'" Yet the
end results show the constraints within which procedural reform
can take place.
B. The Legislative Reaction
Bills based on the preliminary reports were introduced in the
legislature in 1960. They were widely circulated among the bar and
were the subject of public hearings held throughout the state in
1960.82 Professor Weinstein, speaking of the 1960 draft while it was
still under consideration, described the changes and improvements
it would make, but added:
These new provisions are, nevertheless, essentially conserva-
Temporary Commission on the Courts (June 22, 1954)).
11 See REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON THE COURTS, LEG. Doc. No. 18, at 38
(1956).
78 Id.
"' Jack B. Weinstein is now a judge of the Federal District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York.
10 For a description of the work of the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure,
see SIXTH REPORT, supra note 7, at 3334-40.
11 See id. at 3337.
82 See id. at 3334-35.
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tive. They preserve our present legal institutions without appreci-
able change. One of our alumni ... told me that he was disap-
pointed because we had not tried to develop a model procedure,
but we had taken account of the realities of New York practice
and the realities of some New York political problems and the
realities of our present New York institutions....
You can not draft a workable set of practice rules without
taking account of going institutions. In drafting we had to keep in
mind the kind of facilities that are available and the kind and
training of people who will administer them.8 3
Nonetheless, the 1960 proposals were apparently too radical
and were not enacted.84 A new draft was proposed for the 1961
legislative session. The Senate Finance Committee listed forty-four
changes in the new draft from the 1960 version. 5 A number of the
changes could be expected to diminish the proposed code's poten-
tial impact on delay. For example, the final version provided that
the summons could be served without the complaint, while the
1960 proposal would have required them to be served together.8 "
Also, proposed pleading simplification was compromised in part,
the twelve person jury was retained (as opposed to the proposed
reduction to six), the right to appeal from intermediate orders was
restored, a court order was required as a condition of obtaining
interrogatories in negligence cases if a deposition had also been
used, the power of the judge to conduct the voir dire was elimi-
nated, the mandatory pretrial hearing was dropped, and a pro-
posed "tender" device, which would have imposed costs on a plain-
tiff who declined a settlement offer under certain circumstances,
was restricted so that it would not apply in negligence cases.87
Enactment of reform failed again in 1961, necessitating fur-
ther modifications. 8 One proposal, then eliminated, would have
provided for payment of attorneys' fees for frivolous motions.89
Further, all amendments to existing discovery practice were elimi-
' Weinstein, supra note 8, at 53 (footnote omitted).
8 See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 7, at 3335.
See id. at 3335-37.
86 See id. at 3336; cf. Weinstein, supra note 8, at 72-73 (discussing reasons for and
against requiring summons and complaint to be served together).
87 See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 7, at 3336. For a discussion of some of these issues
and an explanation of why they were adopted, see Weinstein, Trends in Civil Practice, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (1962).
81 See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 7, at 3337.
81 See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 7, at 3337; Weinstein, supra note 87, at 1438-39.
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nated, the bill of particulars was restored, and intermediate appeal
availability was again expanded, as was the right of appeal to the
New York Court of Appeals."°
Legislative control over the rule making process was a perva-
sive issue. The Advisory Committee had proposed that matters of
"basic policy" would be enacted as statutes, subject to future
change only by the legislature, and that procedural detail should
be regulated by "rules" which could be controlled in the future by
the Judicial Conference.91 Under a compromise, which reflected
legislative hostility to the original proposal, the Judicial Confer-
ence was given the power to amend or adopt rules (so long as not
inconsistent with statute), subject to legislative veto.92
C. The CPLR Enacted
The CPLR was finally approved in 1962.93 In his message of
approval, Governor Rockefeller said that the legislation "holds the
promise of helping to establish New York's judicial system once
again as an example of modern and efficient administration of
justice."94
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate the
CPLR, it is important to note that despite its limitations, its
achievements were real. Not the least of these were that by elimi-
nating a good deal of unnecessary detail ("enough words to fill a
substantial novel-though it would certainly be a dull one," stated
Professor Weinstein)9 5 and by imposing some rationality on the or-
der in which the rules were organized, it made the litigation system
more accessible to the practitioner and reduced the emphasis on
"nicety." More substantial reforms, as listed in Governor Rockefel-
ler's approval message, included: a modern long-arm statute which
expanded the state's in personam jurisdiction; a modernization of
the statutes of limitation; the establishment of a uniform proce-
dure for "special proceedings"; a relaxation of the requirement of
particularity in pleading a cause of action; and the substitution of
90 See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 7, at 3337-38.
91 Id. at 3338.
92 Id. at 3338-39. The Judicial Conference, however, was later abolished. Presently, the
legislature has the sole authority to amend rules and laws in the CPLR. See D. SIEGEL,
supra note 2, § 2, at 1 (Supp. 1987).
-3 Ch. 308-318, [1962] N.Y. Laws 593 (McKinney).
" See Governor's Memorandum, supra note 6, at 3621.
" See Weinstein, supra note 8, at 51.
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a single motion for summary judgment before answer for the many
motions previously available.9
Still, of the package actually enacted, Professor Weinstein
later said, "Viewed in the perspective of four revolutionary de-
cades, New York's recently adopted [CPLR] may be characterized
as a conservative-in some respects reactionary-restatement of
the practice as it had been developing." 9' He argued that the
CPLR was conservative in two respects. First, it failed to incorpo-
rate some of the important technical procedural advances which
had been achieved in other codes, such as, by failing to liberalize
pretrial discovery practice.9" Second, and more basically, it broke
no new ground; it took no bold or imaginative steps. In this vein,
he noted how little had been done in adopting summary proce-
dures which would short circuit the normal litigation path. 9
It would be hard to argue that the changes brought by the
CPLR could or would significantly improve the pace of litigation.
Most of the Advisory Committee's recommendations that might
have been helpful were not approved by the legislature. Others
that could be imagined were not proposed, in recognition of their
likely fate.
D. Delay in the Aftermath
Available statistics indicate that the CPLR did not, in fact,
expedite litigation or reduce delay. Table A indicates that while
the number of civil dispositions by the Supreme Court increased in
the years following the adoption of the CPLR, this was more likely
due to the addition of thirty-five new judges in 1962-63. The rate
of disposition per judge actually dropped in that year and contin-
ued to drop for most of the following ten years. The reasons for
this are obscure. It may be that unfamiliarity with the new code on
the part of the bar and the judiciary accounts for the drop in dis-
0" See Governor's Memorandum, supra note 6, at 3621. For a discussion of other posi-
tive elements resulting from the enactment of the CPLR, see Weinstein, supra note 87. A
substantial reorganization and rationalization of the court system was also adopted in 1962.
See Chs. 684-705, [19621 N.Y. Laws 2191 (McKinney); see also Governor's Memorandum on
Approval of chs. 684-705, N.Y. Laws (1962), reprinted in [1962] N.Y. Laws 3649 (McKin-
ney) (praising and discussing elements of court reorganization). This reform, like the CPLR,
could be traced to the Temporary Commission on the Courts. See PRELIMINARY REPORT,
supra note 67, at 11, 27.
97 Weinstein, supra note 87, at 1431.
98 Id. at 1437-39.
01 Id. at 1433-34.
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position rates in the five years after enactment and that the im-
provement after 1969 is evidence that a learning period was neces-
sary. On the whole, however, the statistics do not suggest that the
CPLR improved the efficiency of the courts. 100
TABLE A 101
New York State Supreme Court Caseload and Disposition Rates:
1955-1977
Year New Cases Dispositions Pending Number of Civil
(Notes of Cases Supreme Court Dispositions
Issue Filed) Trial Justices per Judge
Authorized
1955-56 56,057 54,794 48,344 106 536
1956-57 55,774 51,985 52,014 106 490
1957-58 50,635 57,615 36,566 106 544
1958-59 59,097 49,005 46,970 115 426
1959-60 61,138 50,728 57,362 121 419
1960-61 58,633 52,510 63,483 129 407
1961-62 59,156 52,832 69,760 137 386
1962-63 56,477 64,309 61,837 172 374
1963-64 58,363 63,391 56,758 172 369
1964-65 58,142 57,732 57,068 172 336
1965-66 58,261 53,572 61,442 171 313
1966-67 59,854 53,684 67,579 171 314
1967-68 62,683 58,406 71,855 171 342
1968-69 69,783 69,706 71,685 225 310
1969-70 75,809 77,988 69,151 225 347
1970-71 86,026 85,426 68,428 227 376
"I5 The right hand column of Table A purports to measure the efficiency of the court
system by reporting the disposition rate per authorized judge. This should be viewed with
caution for several reasons. First, this table does not reflect the impact of the criminal
docket of the Supreme Court. These figures are not published; criminal dispositions are
reported as a composite of the county courts and the Supreme Court. This problem is com-
pounded by the fact that in 1962 the legislature abolished the Court of General Sessions of
the City of New York and the County Court for the City of New York and transferred their
criminal and civil jurisdictions, and their personnel to the Supreme Court. [1962] N.Y. Laws
692 (McKinney). Second, the rate of disposition may have been affected by other procedural
or court management techniques introduced apart from the CPLR. Third, the number of
authorized judges does not usually equal the number of judges actually available. Some po-
sitions may not be filled in some years. On the other hand, "para" Supreme Court Justices
are sometimes employed, such as Civil Court judges temporarily assigned to the Supreme
Court. Unfortunately, these statistics are not published. Nonetheless, the disposition rate, if
accepted as only a rough guide, is useful in spotting trends.
Insofar as Table A reports incoming, pending, and disposed of cases, it reflects only
those which were placed on the calendar. Since only cases certified as ready for trial are
placed on the calendar, there are actions started, pending, and disposed of which are never
reported. It is unclear whether this is a significant number.
101 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK [herein-
after ANNUAL REPORTS].
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1973-74
1975
1976
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94,425
95,762
104,414
115,514
111,018
112,992
98,326
101,620
107,180
111,193
109,049
109,769
64,846
58,232
55,442
62,363
62,899
66,398
Table B shows the delay in two traditionally backlogged coun-
ties, New York and Nassau. Since a case cannot be on the calendar
until it is ready to be tried,10 2 all time that expires after that can
be considered delay. Indeed, considerable delay might already have
elapsed before the case was put on the calendar. Table B indicates
some improvement in Nassau County in the years after the CPLR
was adopted, but also shows a worsening of the situation in New
York County.
TABLE B 03
Average Months on Calendar at Time of Disposition: 1957-1972
New York County Nassau County
Year All Cases Tort Jury All Cases Tort Jury
1957-58 9.0 15 20.0 44
1958-59 7.0 21 24.0 56
1959-60 8.0 18 14.7 61
1960-61 10.1 20 15.1 65
1961-62 11.5 18 23.7 56
1962-63 10.8 18 29.3 44
1963-64 10.0 12 24.8 36
1964-65 9.3 15 21.0 28
1965-66 11.2 19 18.5 28
1966-67 12.7 27 18.7 28
1967-68 14.1 34 16.7 32
1968-69 14.5 39 16.8 31
1969-70 14.9 44 15.7 29
1970-71 14.1 44 14.1 25
1971-72 15.1 28 9.3 21
CONCLUSION
The CPLR and its history provides a paradox of procedural
reform. The political will that led to this reform of civil procedure
in New York came largely from popular and professional concern
102 See [1988] 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 202.21 (Uniform Rules for Supreme Court and County
Courts). Under the certificate of readiness rule adopted in 1956, a case cannot be put on the
calendar until it is certified as ready for trial. Id. For historical background and analysis of
the certificate of readiness rule, see DELAY IN THE COURT, supra note 5, at 155-67.
102 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 101.
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with civil litigation delay. Nonetheless, the reform actually
adopted was unlikely to, and in fact did not, have any salutary
effect on the pace of litigation. This pattern has probably been re-
peated not only in New York but in other jurisdictions. Court de-
lay is perhaps the only issue likely to bring civil procedure to pop-
ular attention and thus to the attention of political leaders. But
reform of procedure within culturally and politically acceptable
limits cannot have a substantial effect on the problem. This is not
to suggest that nothing can be done to improve litigation pace
apart from adding judges or closing the courthouse door to certain
kinds of cases. On the contrary, some literature supports the claim
that court administration techniques used by effective managers
can do so. Nor do I suggest that the health of a court system can
be measured predominantly by the rate of its output. Quality of
result and fairness of procedures are much more important. None-
theless, the paradox of reform illustrated by the CPLR deserves
further attention from students of procedure. Is it possible to sub-
stantially improve the pace of litigation in a society through proce-
dural reforms which do not violate the essential norms of its dis-
pute resolution system? If so, under what conditions may the
political will to do so be mobilized? The history of the CPLR sug-
gests that delay crises can mobilize political will, but not necessa-
rily enough to provoke fundamental change.
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